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INTRODUCTION
After a brief hiatus, the climate litigation wars have flared back to life
in a new arena: the broad and unruly panoply of state tort law. This renewed
fighting breaks the uneasy armistice that had emerged in 2011 when the U.S.
Supreme Court, in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, foreclosed
federal common law public nuisance torts for climate change damages by
ruling that the federal Clean Air Act displaced those claims.1 That lull ended
abruptly in 2017 and 2018 when a battalion of local governments in
California, New York, Colorado, Washington State, and Rhode Island
brought new tort lawsuits under their respective state laws against energy
producers in both state and federal courts.2 These actions squarely raise the
Lecturer, University of Houston Law Center.
1 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
2 Complaint, County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 17-CIV-03222 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 17,
2017) [hereinafter San Mateo Complaint]; Complaint, Marin County v. Chevron Corp., No. 17-CIV02586 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 17, 2017) [hereinafter Marin Complaint]; Complaint, City of Imperial Beach
v. Chevron Corp., No. C17-01227 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 17, 2017) [hereinafter Imperial Beach Complaint];
Complaint, State v. BP P.L.C., No. CGC-17-561370 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Oakland
Complaint]; Complaint, City of Richmond v. Chevron Corp., No. C18-00055 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 22,
2018); Complaint, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-cv-182 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 9, 2018) [hereinafter
New York City Complaint]; Complaint, Bd. of Cty. Comm¶rs of Boulder Cty. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.),
Inc., No. 18-cv-030349 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Boulder Complaint]; Complaint, King
County v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-2-11859-0 (Wash. Super. Ct. May 9, 2018) [hereinafter Seattle Complaint].
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challenge of how to manage the possibility of multiple state and federal court
tort actions under varying state laws against corporations, governments, and
individuals for their roles in contributing to climate change damages.
So far, the California tort actions have taken two different approaches.
The first group²filed by San Mateo County, Marin County, and the City of
Imperial Beach²alleges a broad array of classical state law tort actions such
as public nuisance, private nuisance, negligence, trespass, and failure to
warn.3 In addition, the governments also assert strict liability claims for
failure to warn and design defects.4 Their lawsuits target a broad array of
thirty-seven large fossil fuel companies, mining corporations, energy trading
companies, and up to 100 ³John Doe´ corporate entities.5 The complaints
seek unspecified compensatory damages, equitable relief to abate nuisances,
disgorgement of profits, punitive damages, and reasonable attorney¶s fees.6
By contrast, most of the remaining plaintiffs²the cities of San
Francisco, Oakland, and the county governments encompassing Boulder,
Colorado and Seattle, Washington²have brought in their respective state
courts, a narrower set of public nuisance and other tort claims against a
comparatively small group of fossil fuel energy companies.7 For example,
rather than seeking broad and unspecified compensatory and punitive
damages, San Francisco¶s complaint requests the creation of an abatement
fund to help take needed steps, like construction of a dike wall to deal with
anticipated climate change effects such as rising sea levels and enhanced
storm severity.8
In addition to local governments in California, Colorado, and
Washington state, the City of New York has filed its own climate tort action
under common law theories of recovery. Rather than use its state¶s courts,
however, the City of New York brought its action in the Southern District of
New York under federal diversity jurisdiction.9 Its complaint carefully targets
3 San Mateo Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 78±98 (eight counts alleging public nuisance, strict
liability, failure to warn, private nuisance, negligence, and trespass); Marin Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶
79±87 (same); Imperial Beach Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 75±95 (same).
4 San Mateo Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 78±98 (eight counts alleging public nuisance, strict
liability, failure to warn, private nuisance, negligence, and trespass); Marin Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶
79±87 (same); Imperial Beach Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 75±95 (same).
5 San Mateo Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 6±22; Marin Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 6±23; Imperial
Beach Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 5±22.
6 San Mateo Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 98±99; Marin Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 99±100;
Imperial Beach Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 95±96.
7 For example, the King County complaint lists BP P.L.C., Chevron Corp., ConocoPhilips, Exxon
Mobil Corp., and Royal Dutch Shell P.L.C. Seattle Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 1, 4±8. The complaint also
leaves room for up to 10 Doe defendants. Id.
8 Oakland Complaint, supra note 2, ¶ 39.
9 New York City Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 13±14 (asserting diversity jurisdiction).
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only five energy corporate defendants in a way that preserves the parties¶
complete diversity,10 and specifically eschews any claims for damages
arising from federal land that might create a federal question. The City has
demanded monetary compensation for its damages and requested a jury trial.
The most recent lawsuit has arisen in Rhode Island, where the state has
brought a state law tort action in its Superior Court against 21 named energy
companies and up to 100 John Doe defendants.11 The lawsuit alleges, like the
other state actions, that the companies knew that their products contributed
to climate change, but they continued to sell them through misrepresentations
and false statements.12 The state raises several state tort causes of action,
including public nuisance, negligent failure to warn, negligent design defect,
trespass, and strict liability failure to warn and design defect.13 In addition,
Rhode Island also contends that the companies¶ actions impaired the state¶s
public trust resources and violated its state Environmental Rights Act.14 The
complaint seeks equitable relief (including abatement of the nuisance),
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and disgorgement of profits,15 and
it also requests the costs of the suit itself.16 This action, for the first time,
involves an action by an attorney general on behalf of the state government
itself rather than a local county or municipal government.17
While all of these cases remain at the earliest stages of motion practice
and dispositive motions, they have already generated a flurry of notable
tactical maneuvers, precedent-setting innovations in case management, and

10 The complaint targets BP P.L.C, Chevron Corporation, ConocoPhillips, Exxon Mobil
Corporation, and Royal Dutch Shell PLC. Id. ¶¶ 16±23. It specifically contends that the defendants are
citizens of California, New Jersey, Texas, Delaware, England, and the Netherlands. Id. ¶ 31.
11 Complaint, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I. Super. Ct. Providence Cty.
July 2, 2018) [hereinafter Rhode Island Complaint].
12 Id. ¶¶ 106±224.
13 Id. ¶¶ 225±93.
14 Id. ¶¶ 294±314.
15 Id. ¶ 315.
16 Id. The request for costs could prove especially important because Rhode Island retained outside
counsel to serve as co-counsel with the Attorney General. The use of outside counsel, especially on a
contingency fee basis, has proven enormously controversial in natural resource damages litigation brought
by state agency trustees. Julie E. Steiner, The Illegality of Contingency Fee Arrangements When
Prosecuting Public Natural Resource Damage Claims and the Need for Legislative Reform, 32 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL¶Y REV. 169 (2007).
17
As this article was going to press, the City of Baltimore filed its own climate tort lawsuit
against 26 energy corporations on July 20, 2018. See Complaint with Request for Jury Trial, Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., No. 24C18004219 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City July 20, 2018). Like
many of the prior actions by other local governments, the city¶s complaint alleges that the defendants
made false statements on climate science and fuel emissions, and it asserts counts of private nuisance,
public nuisance, trespass, strict liability failure to warn, negligent failure to warn, strict liability design
defect, negligent design defect, and the state¶s Consumer Protection Act. Id. ¶¶ 107±30.
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important substantive rulings. All of the California court cases and the
Washington action have already seen motions to remove them to federal
court on differing grounds,18 and some of the plaintiffs have responded by
either dismissing problematic defendants19 or vigorously opposing the
grounds for removal and dismissal posed by bankrupt defendants.20 The fast
pace and varying fora have, unsurprisingly, already generated conflicting
rulings: one judge has found that federal common law controlled the local
government¶s tort claims as they relate to the defendants¶ marketing and sales
of petroleum products,21 moved ahead with substantive briefing (including
an innovative ³climate science tutorial´),22 and then decided to defer to the
legislative and executive branches by dismissing the complaints.23 The
Southern District of New York reached a similar conclusion and also
dismissed the action before it,24 and the City of New York had already
announced its intent to appeal the ruling.25 By contrast, the San Mateo County
court ruled that federal common law does not control the lawsuit, and instead
remanded the removed case back to the California trial court.26 The decisions
in both cases will likely end up in a quick appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Given

18 See, e.g., Notice of Removal, King County v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-CV-00758-RSL (W.D. Wash.
May 9, 2018). As of the date of this article, the defendants in the Colorado and Rhode Island state court
actions have not sought to remove the cases to federal court.
19 The City of San Mateo voluntarily dismissed without prejudice Statoil USA (an agency of the
state of Norway) from its original complaint on July 17, 2017. Chevron Corporation and Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. subsequently brought a third-party complaint against Statoil on December 15, 2017. Third-Party
Complaint of Defendants Chevron Corporation and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. for Indemnity and Contribution
Against Third-Party Defendant Statoil USA, County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 17-CV-4929VC (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2017). The renewed presence of Statoil, as a unit of a foreign sovereign entity
arguably entitled to sovereign immunity defenses, will likely bolster Chevron¶s attempts retain the lawsuit
in federal court.
20 The Eastern District of Missouri bankruptcy court enforced the discharge and injunction
provisions of Peabody Energy¶s Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan by enjoining San Mateo, Imperial Beach,
and Marin Counties from pursuing their tort action against the companies. In re Peabody Energy Corp.,
No. 16-42529-399, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3691 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 24, 2017).
21 Order Denying Motions to Remand at 5±8, California v. BP P.L.C., No. 17-CV-06012 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 27, 2018) [hereinafter Oakland, Denying Motion to Remand].
22 Notice re Tutorial at 1±2, California v. BP P.L.C., No. 17-CV-06012 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018).
23 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaints, California v. BP P.L.C., No. 17-CV06011-WHA (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2018).
24
Opinion and Order, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-CV-00182-JFK (S.D.N.Y.
July 19, 2018).
25
Brendon Pierson, Oil Majors Win Dismissal of New York City Climate Lawsuit, REUTERS
(July 19, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/new-york-climatechange-lawsuit/oil-majors-windismissal-of-new-york-city-climate-lawsuit-idUSL1N1UF1YC.
26 Order Granting Motions to Remand at 1±3, County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 17CIV-03222 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2018) [hereinafter San Mateo, Order Granting Motion to Remand].
Judge Chhabria stayed the remand order for 42 days while Judge Alford¶s conflicting ruling in the Oakland
trial underwent expedited appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Id.
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the quick proliferation of venue and jurisdictional challenges, a litigative
maelstrom looms ahead.
This essay explores how judicial federalism principles can help organize
and structure these emerging state law climate tort initiatives. Rather than
add to the debate on whether courts are institutionally suited to hear these
claims in the first place, or whether federal or state courts would offer the
better venue, this analysis instead simply assumes that these state law actions
are coming. If so, we could soon face a situation where multiple state and
federal courts will host sprawling and conflicting state law climate liability
tort claims involving overlapping plaintiffs and defendants. What principles
offer the best path to structure and manage such an overwhelming litigative
scrum?
Judicial federalism concepts could provide some of the guidance needed
to structure and coordinate litigation in multiple fora at different levels of
federal and state government. While most prior academic analysis has
centered on how federalism allocates power between state and federal
legislatures or agencies, similar concerns regarding preemption,
displacement, and coordination will shape the complementary roles of federal
and state courts in these lawsuits. The differing and idiosyncratic ways that
state courts handle climate torts will reflect fundamental policy choices and
principles built into the U.S. Constitution, federal and state judicial and
environmental statutes, and long-standing fundamental precedents and
judicial practices on civil procedure.
This essay begins with a brisk look at the fate of prior federal common
law climate tort actions, and sketches out the basic tenets and prior analyses
of judicial federalism and its role in mass-party litigation. It then closely
examines how climate tort claims under state law will pose fundamental
challenges to the existing allocation of powers and responsibilities between
federal and state courts, especially when federal courts host actions
controlled by state law and when state courts hear claims involving
extraterritorial impacts and the exercise of judicial authority over nonresident parties. Finally, after reviewing several instances where uncontroversial judicial notions of substantive jurisdiction and procedural rules yield
troublesome results when applied to state law climate torts, it concludes with
suggestions on how to use federalism principles to resolve some of these
difficulties and better harmonize state law climate torts with the requirements
of judicial federalism.
I.

REVIVAL OF CLIMATE TORTS IN NEW FORA

The resurgence of climate tort litigation may seem puzzling given the
ignominious fate of earlier federal climate tort lawsuits. In a highly
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publicized trio of cases²American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,27
Comer v. Murphy Oil Co.,28 and Village of Kivalina v. Exxon29—plaintiffs
brought a variety of federal common law tort claims to recover damages or
seek injunctive relief from large numbers of corporate defendants who had
allegedly contributed to global greenhouse gas emissions. Those cases have
received extensive discussion elsewhere,30 and each lawsuit offered very
different plaintiffs, alleged injuries, actions by defendants, and requested
relief. For example, while Comer sought to bring a class action tort claim for
monetary compensation for damages caused when Hurricane Katrina was
allegedly exacerbated by anthropogenic climate change, American Electric
Power Co. featured public nuisance claims by state and local governments
seeking an injunction to force reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases
from the defendant¶s fossil-fueled power plants.31
Their differences, however, ultimately mattered far less than their key
similarities. First, the district courts in all three cases originally dismissed the
tort actions on a variety of grounds before reaching the merits. In two of those
cases²American Electric Power Co. and Comer²their respective appellate
courts reversed the trial judges¶ dismissals and remanded the cases for
substantive proceedings. In doing so, both the Fifth Circuit and the Second
Circuit initially held that the claims did not pose a non-justiciable political
question, met Article III standing requirements, and posed facially valid
theories for tort recovery.32
Second, and more important, all three cases ultimately ran aground in
the U.S. Supreme Court. After granting certiorari to review the Second
Circuit¶s ruling in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., the Court
unanimously found that the federal Clean Air Act had displaced any potential
federal common law climate tort claims that might have existed previously.33
According to Justice Ginsburg¶s majority opinion, the displacement occurred
when Congress gave EPA the power to regulate greenhouse gas emissions

27

564 U.S. 410 (2011).
585 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2009), revised Oct. 22, 2009, vacated by order granting en banc
review, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed for lack of quorum, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
29 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
30 A literature search on the American Electric Power Co. decision alone, for example, yielded
over 1,900 law review articles discussing the decision on the HeinOnline database.
31 Compare Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 415±19 with Comer, 585 F.3d at 859±60.
32 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009); Comer, 585 F.3d at 859.
33 Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 415. Notably, the Court split evenly on the narrower question
of whether the state governments had standing to bring their public nuisance tort actions at all. Id. at 419±
20. Justice Sotomayor, after participating in the oral argument on the case before the Second Circuit before
her elevation to the Supreme Court, recused herself from the Court¶s decision.
28
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under the Clean Air Act-±even if EPA chose not to exercise that power.34 The
Court¶s prior landmark ruling that the Clean Air Act unambiguously
classified carbon dioxide as a ³pollutant´ subject to regulation under the
Clean Air Act (as well as imposing a duty on EPA to determine whether
greenhouse gas emissions posed an endangerment to human health or the
environment)35 cemented American Electric Power Co.¶s conclusion that
Congress had displaced any possibilities of federal common law tort liability
for those same emissions.36
The American Electric Power Co. ruling effectively brought down the
curtain on further federal common law climate tort actions. On remand, the
Second Circuit and the Comer district court each dismissed the tort actions
with prejudice based on the American Electric Power Co. opinion¶s
rationale.37 The Ninth Circuit, which had abeyed its consideration of the
Kivalina trial court¶s dismissal ruling, joined its brethren shortly afterward
and upheld the trial court¶s dismissal.38 While each of these actions also
alleged state law tort actions under the district courts¶ supplemental
jurisdiction,39 the federal courts in all three cases dismissed the corollary
actions once the primary federal common law tort actions collapsed. Federal
and state common law actions have continued under other theories²namely,
multiple lawsuits seeking to hold federal and state governments accountable
for their failures to control greenhouse gas emissions under the public trust
doctrine40²but the use of common law tort actions to seek climate damages
had almost completely faded from legal actions in U.S. federal courts.
So why renew the wars? The new lawsuits reflect a conscious strategic
choice to revive climate actions by using aspects of state court systems that
fundamentally differ from the federal judicial fora and laws. Most
importantly, the switch to state law claims within a state court system (or a
federal court¶s diversity jurisdiction) potentially sidesteps the most
34

Id. at 423.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528±29 (2007).
36 Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 426±29.
37 As noted earlier, a panel of the Fifth Circuit initially issued an opinion that concluded the district
court had both subject matter jurisdiction and competence to hear the tort claims raised by the class action
defendants. That decision, however, was vacated when the full Fifth Circuit voted to rehear the case en
banc. When subsequent recusals by the judges deprived the court of a quorum, the Fifth Circuit lost its
capacity to hear the appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently refused to hear an appeal of the case
brought via a writ for mandamus. See supra note 28.
38 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
39 Tracy D. Hester, A New Front Blowing In: State Law and the Future of Climate Change Public
Nuisance Litigation, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 49, 77 n.103 (2012) (plaintiffs invoked the federal district
court¶s supplemental jurisdiction to hear related state law claims in all three cases).
40 Michael C. Blumm & Mary C. Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process,
and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (2017).
35
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troublesome barriers that bedeviled federal common law tort climate claims:
displacement defenses, standing challenges, political question limitations on
judicial competence, and barriers to admissibility of expert testimony and
evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence.41 Because state courts
generally operate as courts of general jurisdiction, they avoid the deeply
rooted limits woven into federal judicial powers as courts of limited
jurisdiction subject to separation of powers constraints and Article III textual
limitations.42
Despite this fundamental difference in approach and fora, a reenactment mentality has already set in. Virtually all of the initial public media
coverage and scholarly comments pointed out the unhappy history of the
federal common law tort claims and the likely parallel challenges that would
arise against the California actions.43 The most generous initial assessments,
in fact, acknowledged the differences between the first California lawsuits
and the prior trio of federal climate tort actions, but nonetheless pointed out
the significant hurdles and barriers that the California lawsuits will face.44
Given the ongoing battles over removal, bankruptcy bars, preemption,
displacement, standing, justiciability, equitable defenses, and other numerous
procedural and jurisdictional challenges that the defendants will likely raise,
these difficulties are as daunting as promised.
Rather than revisit these jurisdictional and procedural skirmishes, this
essay instead takes seriously the possible need to manage and administer state
climate tort lawsuits. In particular, it assumes that some of the current crop
of California, Colorado, Washington, Rhode Island, and New York climate
tort actions will successfully navigate the threshold challenges raised against
them, and that they will then proceed into full-fledged substantive discovery
and summary judgment duels. In this scenario, a large and varying cohort of
entities that contributed to recent or historical greenhouse gas emissions may
face a host of state law tort suits before multiple fora and varying state civil
procedures. This variety, however, contrasts with the most unique features of
climate tort claims²namely, these lawsuits allege tortious actions that have
effects on a global scale even if the acts themselves of emitting greenhouse

41

See Hester, supra note 39, at 55±67.
Id. at 73.
43 See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Chevron Says Climate Change Lawsuit ‘Not Viable’ As It Prepares to
(Mar.
21,
2018),
Educate
Judge
on
Science,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/03/21/chevron-says-climate-change-lawsuit-notviable-as -it-prepares-to-tutor-judge-on-the-science/#a8a141edcd478; John Schwartz, Climate Lawsuits,
Once Limited to the Coasts, Jump Inland, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018),
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/climate/exxon-climate-lawsuit-colorado.html.
44 See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Climate Lawyers Hope “Public Nuisance” Strategy Reverses Years of
Failure, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/02/12/climatelawyers-hope-public-nuisance-strategy-reverses-years-of-failure/#25449c8670f8.
42
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gases are indistinguishable among a vast host of sources at the local level.
The location of emissions that give rise to state court jurisdiction, from that
perspective, seems almost accidental.
Before exploring the potential challenges posed by full-throated climate
state tort litigation, at least one substantive threshold challenge needs close
examination because it may affect the ultimate disposition of all the state tort
actions. The most immediate and weighty challenge to state tort law climate
actions will likely center on preemption challenges. More specifically,
defendants will almost certainly shift some of their prior displacement
challenges in the federal common law tort actions to a more rigorous
preemption attack by alleging that the federal Clean Air Act substantively
preempts state law tort actions that impose liability for federally permitted
emissions or set out equitable restrictions on federally authorized releases.
To some extent, the U.S. Supreme Court has already outlined the
principles of preemption for cross-border state environmental tort claims in
its seminal decision in International Paper Co. v. Oulette.45 When faced with
a claim that the federal Clean Water Act46 preempted a nuisance tort claim
brought in a Vermont state court for damages incurred in Vermont caused by
a discharge in New York, the Court ruled that the Clean Water Act only
allowed state tort nuisance actions in the courts of the state which issued the
Clean Water Act permit that governed the discharge.47 This approach, the
Court reasoned, would protect dischargers from multiple lawsuits in differing
fora to recover damages from discharges permitted by a different state.48 It
also consolidated responsibility on the discharger¶s state to assure that its
permits protected the environment and the public against damaging
releases.49 Despite this guidance from Outlette, however, a circuit split has
developed on whether the federal Clean Air Act preempts state law tort
actions over emissions from permitted facilities.50
Extending Oulette¶s rationale to preempt state law climate tort actions
against interstate point sources of greenhouse gas emissions creates
significant problems. First, and most importantly, as Oulette demonstrates,
45

479 U.S. 481 (1987).
The federal Clean Water Act contains clauses to preserve state law claims that parallel similar
provisions in the Clean Air Act. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1370 (West 2017). In fact, Congress essentially adopted
the Clean Water Act¶s preemption and state law preservation provisions when it subsequently adopted the
federal Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(e) (West 2017).
47 Oulette, 479 U.S. at 498±500.
48 Id. at 496±97.
49 Id. at 492±500.
50 Compare N.C. ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) (cross-border
air emission tort claims preempted) with Merrick v. Diageo Ams. Supply, Inc., 805 F.3d 685 (6th Cir.
2015) and Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013).
46
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the threshold for preemption of state common law claims is significantly
higher than the burdens to show displacement of federal common law tort
actions. The former task evokes significant federalism concerns and risks a
damaging intrusion into areas traditionally reserved for state regulatory
authority. Second, the potential for preemption based on a direct conflict
between federal Clean Air Act permit authorizations and state tort law actions
has receded in light of EPA¶s retreat from requiring facilities that emit solely
greenhouse gases to obtain permits under the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration program,51 as well as its announced intent to withdraw
requirements to reduce greenhouse gases from new and existing coal-fired
power plants under the New Source Performance Standard program.52 More
fundamentally, Oulette applied to cross-border emissions from a source in
one state that caused harm in a different state²while with greenhouse gas
emissions, both the emissions and the harm can readily, or even typically,
occur on both sides of a state border. Here, plaintiffs may face the same
burdens of overlapping legal obligations and conflicting burdens of proof that
the defendants faced in the simpler factual setting of Oulette.
The issue of cross-border emissions and the proper site for state law tort
actions becomes especially pressing when the laws differ dramatically
between states. For example, Texas has already legislatively hobbled the
ability to bring nuisance actions for emissions of greenhouse gases in
Texas.53 As a result, the choice of state law in this context can determine the
outcome of a tort action, but the typical criteria used to select the applicable
law for an action²for example, the situs of the harm, the nexus between the
activity and the injury, or the citizenship of the defendant54²may have little
relevance to emissions of greenhouse gases that potentially contribute to
climate change damages on a global scale.55
51 80 Fed. Reg. 50,199 (Aug. 19, 2015). EPA withdrew these portions of the rules in respect to
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014), which rejected EPA¶s interpretation of the
Clean Air Act to impose permit obligations on sources that emitted only greenhouse gases.
52 These rules are also known as the Clean Power Plan. The EPA has issued an Advance Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking to withdraw the Clean Power Plan, see State Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,507±08 (proposed Dec. 28,
2017), and it is conducting public listening sessions to solicit input on whether and how to revoke the rule,
see Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 83 Fed. Reg. 4620 (proposed Feb. 1, 2018).
53 TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.257 (West 2017) (creating an affirmative defense against state law
nuisance actions arising from emissions of greenhouse gases from facilities that have permits under
delegated federal environmental programs for the activities that released the gases).
54 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
55 The federal Clean Air Act allows states to assume primacy for implementing and enforcing their
own clean air laws and rules in lieu of the federal program through the process of delegation. The
delegation process in turn imposes some degree of uniformity among state programs and laws that must
satisfy baseline federal Clean Water Act requirements. If a state lacks authority to issue air permits to
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Last, Oulette¶s rationale for the situs of tort claims may have little
applicability if the theory of liability shifts away from the emitting activities
themselves. For example, in the Oakland litigation, the trial court refused to
dismiss the claims or remand them to state court because it found that the
activities underlying the tortious claim centered on:
[A]n alleged scheme to produce and sell fossil fuels while
deceiving the public regarding the dangers of global
warming and the benefits of fossil fuels. Plaintiffs do not
bring claims against emitters, but rather bring claims against
defendants for having put fossil fuels into the flow of
international commerce. Importantly, unlike [American
Electric Power Co.] and Kivalina, which sought only to
reach domestic conduct, plaintiffs¶ claims here attack
behavior worldwide. While some of the fuel produced by
defendants is certainly consumed in the United States
(emissions from which are regulated under the Clean Air
Act), greenhouse gases emanating from overseas sources are
equally guilty (perhaps more so) of causing plaintiffs¶ harm.
Yet those foreign emissions are out of the EPA and Clean
Air Act¶s reach.56
Given this shift away from greenhouse gas emissions and federal
permitting for activities that cause them, Oulette’s careful allocation of
jurisdiction and responsibility for permitted sources does not facially apply
to the production and sale of fossil fuels.57
The earlier federal common law tort actions gingerly broached this
topic, but failed to tackle it fully. Because Comer, Kivalina, and Connecticut
v. American Electric Power Co. each raised state law claims under the district
court¶s diversity or supplemental jurisdiction, the three appellate decisions
each touched on preemption grounds in different ways. For example, the
Fifth Circuit¶s panel opinion in Comer (now vacated by the en banc order)
found that ³the clear inapplicability of federal preemption in this case´
weighed against using political question doctrine to dismiss the tort action as

facilities under the federal Clean Air Act (and the EPA has not imposed separate federal requirements
under a Federal Implementation Plan), the Outlette rationale facially would not apply. Here, the EPA no
longer insists that state must prepare their own implementation plans to issue PSD permits to control
greenhouse gas emissions. As a result, states can have enormously different approaches to regulating
greenhouse gas emissions without the constraints of an overlapping federal air permitting framework.
56 Oakland, Denying Motion to Remand, supra note 21, at 7.
57 It should be noted, however, that the federal Clean Air Act also imposes comprehensive and
nationally coordinated requirements for the composition and distribution of mobile source fuels and
additives. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7545±46 (2018).
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a ³de facto preemption of state law.´58 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in
Kivalina noted that, while the U.S. Supreme Court¶s direction in American
Electric Power Co. required the Ninth Circuit to dismiss the tribe¶s federal
common law claims as displaced by the Clean Air Act, the district court had
already dismissed the state law claims without prejudice so that the plaintiffs
could pursue their action in the Alaskan courts.59 And in Connecticut v.
American Electric Power Co., the Second Circuit explicitly declined to rule
on state law public nuisance claims because it concluded that federal
common law controlled the action.60
The new round of state law complaints has already created conflicting
decisions by the California district courts on the possibility of preemption. In
the Oakland litigation, Judge Alsop concluded that the cities¶ public nuisance
claim was ³necessarily governed by federal common law,´ which therefore
preempted California common law claims.61 His rationale, however, focused
on aspects of the claim alleging marketing of fuels outside the United States
which could still be subject to federal common law despite Connecticut v.
American Electric Power Co.62 By contrast, the San Mateo court remanded
its cases to the California state courts because it concluded that the Clean Air
Act¶s displacement of federal common nuisance claims meant that no federal
common law remained to justify removal to federal court.63
The Southern District of New York recently added to the discord by
dismissing the City of New York¶s tort action.64 Judge Keenan¶s rationale
closely paralleled Judge Alsop¶s prior opinion in the Oakland dismissal: the
plaintiffs alleged injuries that arose from the worldwide marketing and sales
of fuels that consumers used on a global scale. This enormous scope of

58

Comer v. Murphy Oil Co., 585 F.3d 855, 879 (5th Cir. 2009).
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 866 (9th Cir. 2012) (Pro, J.,
concurring).
60 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 392 (2d Cir. 2009).
61 Oakland, Denying Motion to Remand, supra note 21, at 3.
62 Id. Judge Alsop rested his conclusion on both the need for a uniform standard of decision, ³[a]
patchwork of fifty different answers to the same fundamental global issue would be unworkable,´ and the
plaintiff¶s reliance on the defendants¶ actions in marketing fuel products outside of the United States. Id.
at 4±5. Interestingly, he did not rule on whether the Clean Air Act¶s displacement of federal common law
left open possible state law actions against solely domestic emitters of greenhouse gases. Id. at 6±7.
63 San Mateo, Order Granting Motion to Remand, supra note 26, at 2±3 (³Because federal
common law does not govern the plaintiffs¶ claims, it also does not preclude them from asserting the state
law claims in these lawsuits. Simply put, these cases should not have been removed to federal court on
the basis of federal common law that no longer exists.´). Judge Chhabria, however, left open the possibility
that federal law might still preempt the nuisance claims. Id. at 5 (³It may even be that these local actions
are federally preempted.´).
64
Opinion and Order, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-CV-00182-JFK (S.D.N.Y.
July 19, 2018).
59
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international activities raised special concerns of international relations and
the need for consistent standards for judgment that demand the application of
federal common law rather than state tort law.65 Once federal common law
precluded state tort law, however, the American Electric Power Co. decision
made clear that the Clean Air Act had already displaced any federal law.
Therefore, no action could take proceed, and the court dismissed the action.66
This stark division between the federal district courts on such fundamental issues augers an inevitable appellate review and, potentially, conflicts
among the Ninth, Second, and Tenth Circuits.67 The dismissals in the
Oakland and New York City cases create some sense of momentum against
the current crop of lawsuits, but several factors may challenge a quick
appellate affirmance of those decisions. First, all three district courts in each
of the original wave of federal common law climate tort actions dismissed
the lawsuits on various grounds. Two of those decisions were initially
reversed in the Second and Fifth Circuits, however, and the Ninth Circuit¶s
review was truncated by the U.S. Supreme Court¶s intervening decision in
American Electric Power Co. Federal appellate courts here may similarly
offer a greater willingness to uphold the federal courts¶ power to hear climate
tort claims, even if they subsequently decline them on prudential, procedural,
or substantive grounds. Second, both the Oakland and the New York City
dismissals focus on the federal common law¶s preemption of state law tort
claims without examining whether the federal Clean Air Act¶s express
statutory preemption provisions68 might require more than a general reliance
on federal common law to preempt this entire class of state law claims. While
this statutory preemption analysis would be undoubtedly complex and hard
to predict,69 this approach would give proper weight to Congress¶ setting of
the scope of preemption rather than general federal common law principles.70

65

Id. ¶¶ 10±13.
Id. ¶¶ 13±22.
67
This prediction focuses on, obviously, decisions that originate from federal district courts.
State court decisions (including appellate reviews) resting on adequate and independent state law grounds
may offer limited, if any, grounds for federal judicial review. See discussion infra note 80.
68
42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2018) (citizen suit provision, which simultaneously operates as a
savings clause); id. § 7416 (³Retention of State Authority´).
69
As noted above, the federal appellate courts have already split on the scope of preemption
of state law tort claims by the federal Clean Air Act over interstate emissions. See discussion supra note
49. Notably, both the Oakland and the New York City dismissals focused on the plaintiffs¶ attempt to shift
the alleged wrongful action from combustion of fossil fuels generally to the marketing and false representations related to sales of fossil fuels. The Clean Air Act, however, imposes extensive requirements on the
composition and distribution of fuels, and the fuels program of the Clean Air Act has one of the statute¶s
strongest federal preemptive effects. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521±54 (2018).
70
While both the Oakland and New York City dismissals emphasized the primary roles of
the legislative and executive branches when they declined to craft a new federal common law tort cause
66
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II. NAVIGATING THE CONFLICT WITH JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
PRINCIPLES
If the traditional tools of preemption or displacement will not
necessarily offer a viable means to cabin the scope of state law tort actions
for climate liability, how can the courts navigate a potential morass of
overlapping, burdensome, and conflicting state lawsuits? One possible
strategy might lie in the foundational principles of judicial federalism.
Federalism concerns have not suffered from a lack of attention by legal
scholars, and judicial federalism concepts in particular have spurred the
development of a rich and complex body of scholarship and analysis.71
Judicial federalism explores how the core principles underlying federalism
affect the allocation of powers and responsibilities between federal and state
judicial systems and administration of justice. To some extent, it necessarily
overlaps with the larger body of law focused on how state statutes and
common law coordinate with federal laws. But by focusing on judicial
powers and systems, it weighs those same concerns within the narrow sphere
of the scope and frailties of judicial power itself.
The current climate change policy debate has largely not focused on the
judicial aspects of federalism. Much of prior federalism legal scholarship has
centered on the proper allocation of authority between Congress and states
on the formulation of legislative priorities. For example, numerous scholars
have explored how aggressive state legislative initiatives (such as
California¶s carbon trading and greenhouse gas emission regulations) might
conflict with powers and responsibilities vested solely or primarily in
Congress.72 To the extent that judicial federalism concerns in climate liability
tort actions have surfaced, they have largely helped analyze how federal

of action, each opinion relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court¶s recent opinion in Jesner v. Arab Bank,
PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018). That decision, however, stressed the importance of deferring to the
legislative branch when interpreting statutory language that pertains to international relations and the
conduct of the nation¶s foreign affairs. Id. at 1403. These concerns led the Court to interpret the Alien Tort
Claims Act to not support claims against foreign corporate entities. Id. at 1398±1402. While these concerns
will inform the court¶s construction of the Clean Air Act preemption provision, the Jesner rationale should
not be read to broadly foreclose the development of federal common law causes of action outside of the
context of statutory interpretation.
71 See, e.g., Thomas Baker, A Catalogue of Judicial Federalism in the United States, 46 S.C. L.
REV. 835 (1995) (and sources listed therein).
72 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Shana Starobin, The Legal Risk of Regulating Climate Change at
REV.
(Sept.
18,
2017),
the
Subnational
Level,
REGULATORY
https://www.theregreview.org/2017/09/18/coglianese-starobin-legal-risks-climate-change-subnational/.
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statutes and regulations can constrain or preempt the ability of state courts
and judges to hear certain tort claims alleging climate damages.73
A. Judicial Federalism Foundations and Constitutional Mechanisms
In the judicial arena, federalism principles provided the justifications for
creating dual federal and state judicial systems and allocating power between
them. The differences between the systems include, for example, the
inherently limited subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts as
compared with the typical general jurisdiction of state courts, the capacity for
federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over individuals outside the
boundaries of a particular state (if Congress has statutorily granted the federal
court that power), and the ability of federal court actions to invoke the power
of the Supremacy Clause to override conflicting state court decisions based
on federal constitutional or statutory precepts.74
The creation of these overlapping judicial systems reflects the deep
policy principles that underlie U.S. federalism. While maintaining two
overlapping and (arguably) duplicative judicial systems appears puzzling at
first glance, this arrangement serves important purposes. For example, it
protects non-resident litigants from favoritism towards local claimants by
allowing removal of certain claims to federal court and the ability to seek a
federal forum even for claims rooted in state law under the court¶s diversity
jurisdiction. Similarly, the availability of a federal court system presumably
helps assure greater uniformity of decisions through the availability of federal
judicial review. It also protects federal authority and avoids fragmentation
and disruption of national standards and policies through federal judicial
implementation of preemption and displacement principles.
At its most fundamental level, the dual court systems reflect a
substantive democratic choice about the suitability of particular courts or fora
for certain categories of claims, including the availability of federal citizen
suit actions under environmental programs delegated to state governments
for administration, the investment of exclusive jurisdiction for certain claims
in federal courts, and the statutory force and uniformity behind the federal
judiciary¶s civil and criminal procedural rules. Notably, these principles of
judicial federalism should allow the federal and state judicial systems to

73 See, e.g., Alexandra Klass, State Innovation and Preemption: Lessons from State Climate
Change Efforts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1653, 1698±99 (2008); Sean Mullen, The Continuing Vitality of the
Climate Change Nuisance Suit, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 697, 700 n.20 (2011).
74 See Hester, supra note 39, at 55±78 (for a deeper discussion of these distinctions).
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operate as complements to each other¶s authority rather than struggle in a
zero-sum conflict over their respective jurisdictions and powers.75
To implement these goals, the U.S. Constitution uses a combination of
express textual commitments in Article III and other constitutional provisions
as well as structural allocations of power between the federal and state
governments. These features have received deep and detailed judicial and
scholarly analysis in other settings, but some of them bear special mention in
the context of state law climate liability tort litigation. The Supremacy
Clause, for example, obviously plays a central role in assuring that the federal
judiciary retains the ultimate authority to render dispositive opinions on
certain questions reserved to it by statute or constitutional allocation. On a
more prosaic level, the Full Faith and Credit Clause protects the ability of
U.S. citizens to enforce the judgments of one state¶s courts in the judicial
forum of another state or the federal judicial system, including climate
liability judgments rendered in one state that are enforced in another state. 76
The U.S. Constitution also helps harmonize the overlapping federal and state
judicial systems through providing for original jurisdiction for the U.S.
Supreme Court to review judgments involving state parties77 or to review
final state judgments involving federal issues.78 Last, federal principles of
statutory interpretation help coordinate activity between the two judicial
systems by bending statutory interpretation to promote certain systematic
values, such as the federalism clear statement principle and the
extraterritoriality canon.79
The principles of judicial federalism are also woven into the federal
judicial fabric through Article III¶s investiture of judicial power itself. For
example, Article III¶s sculpting of federal judicial power through standing
doctrine reflects the limited jurisdictional powers of the federal courts versus
75 These comments, of course, apply primarily to federal courts invested (and limited) with judicial
power under Article III. Other courts and decisional bodies, such as Article I courts, administrative law
judges and tribunals, and arbitral bodies, do not face these constraints and may have opportunities to
operate in different ways.
76 Beyond the Full Faith and Credit clause¶s mandate in U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, section 1738 of
the Judiciary Act requires federal courts to give the same full faith and credit to a state court¶s ruling that
the court¶s home state would grant to it. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (West 2017). Notably, federal law alone
dictates the res judicata effect of a federal court¶s ruling. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87
(AM. LAW INST. 1982).
77 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (granting original jurisdiction to U.S. Supreme Court for matters
³in which a State shall be party . . . .´).
78 While the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly provide for Supreme Court review of state court
decision, the Judiciary Act of 1789 permits review of state court judgments. The Supreme Court
vigorously upheld this authority in Martin v. Hunter¶s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). Similarly,
the federal courts typically cannot review state court rulings regarding state law (unless they pose some
federal issue). See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 625±26 (1874).
79 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115±16 (2013) (extraterritoriality canon);
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461±64 (1991) (federalism clear statement principle).
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the broader mandates of state general courts, and the scope of other doctrines
that constrain federal judicial review²such as the political question
doctrine²reinforce the complementary role of the federal judiciary in
relation to the state court systems.
These aspects of judicial federalism have already begun to appear²and
shape²state law climate tort actions. They have developed both on the
vertical plane (as allocations of authority between federal and state
judiciaries) and the horizontal plane (as mediations between competing
judicial actions in differing state judiciaries).
1. Vertical allocations of judicial authority (federal-state)
The role of judicial federalism appears most starkly in its distribution of
powers between the federal and state judiciaries. The most preeminent
example, of course, is the availability of federal judicial review for state law
cases brought either under the court¶s diversity jurisdiction or its
supplemental jurisdiction on related federal law claims. In these
circumstances, the federal judiciary can offer a separate forum to resolve
issues under state laws that directly pertain to the imposition of liability for
climate damages under state law tort actions.80 In doing so, the federal court
would provide a venue to resolve foundational liability issues while allowing
claimants to resort to the federal courts¶ procedural rules, inherent
jurisdictional authority for enforcement and remedies, and purportedly more
neutral setting. Notably, the City of New York filed its state law climate tort
action directly in federal district court under its diversity jurisdiction.81
Similar dynamics drive the allocation of authority under standing
doctrines. As noted previously, the federal courts rely on narrower
jurisdictional limits for their ability to grant standing to certain claimants.
These constraints arise from the fundamental investiture of judicial power in
those courts under Article III. State courts, by contrast, enjoy the capacity to
hear broader classes of claimants than their respective state constitutions or
statutes might allow.82 As a result, judicial federalism principles in this
80 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1652 (West 2017). Of course, the scope of federal judicial review of state
court decisions remains constrained to state rulings on questions of federal law. To the extent that a state
court rules on a climate tort lawsuit solely on state law grounds (or on federal and state legal claims that
involve an adequate and independent state ground), the federal courts generally should not have
jurisdiction to review the state court¶s ruling absent both invocation of federal constitutional or other
federal legal concerns, and the unavailability of state review of that federal claim. See Murdock, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) at 593.
81 New York City Complaint, supra note 2.
82 For example, the constitutions and statutes of Mississippi and Hawaii allow broader bases for
standing in their respective state courts. The plaintiffs explicitly relied on Mississippi¶s broader notions
of standing to support their claims in the Comer lawsuit. Hester, supra note 39, at 61±62.
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context will seek to allocate greater power to state courts to hear claims that
fall outside traditional Article III standing doctrine, including potential
climate tort litigants who may not offer the same concrete injury-in-fact or
facially redressable claims that federal judicial prerequisites would demand.
Other doctrines driven by judicial federalism to distribute powers
between the federal and state judiciaries could play potent roles in dictating
which court systems, if any, can hear climate tort liability claims. Most
notably, federal political question doctrines have already played a pivotal role
in limiting initial judicial hearings on climate tort actions brought in federal
courts under federal common law, and they may play a similar role in state
law claims ushered under federal diversity or supplemental jurisdiction. In
addition, abstention doctrines²including Pullman,83 Burford,84 and
Colorado River85²could serve to insulate state court determinations from
federal judicial review and effectively allocate the power to resolve climate
tort liability claims to state judiciaries in lieu of federal courts.86
Beyond these jurisdictional prerequisites, judicial federalism concepts
also offer powerful constraints on the federal court¶s consideration of the
merits of climate liability tort claims under state law. In particular, the Erie
doctrine dictates that federal courts typically adhere to state substantive laws
to resolve claims while relying on federal procedural law to hear those
claims.87 As a result, it will require the federal courts to choose which aspects
of a state¶s tort laws constitute substantive or procedural legal obligations in
a climate liability action.88 Given the enormous liability stakes raised by
some of these claims and the potentially outcome-determinative effect of this
categorization, the judicial federalism aspects of certain routine aspects of
trial management²such as the admissibility of expert testimony and the
application of state privilege laws²may assume dramatically higher profiles.
83 R.R. Comm¶n of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (federal courts can abstain from hearing
federal constitutional claims to give state courts an opportunity to address those issues).
84 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (federal court can abstain from taking case under
its diversity jurisdiction when state court would have greater expertise and issue involves important state
policies or values).
85 Col. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (federal court has
limited discretion to dismiss action where concurrent jurisdiction with state courts threatens duplicative
or wasteful litigation).
86 Federal courts may also enjoy dominant or exclusive jurisdiction in areas where state law
climate tort claims impinge into the federal government¶s foreign affairs authority under the U.S.
Constitution. In addition, the Judiciary Act precludes federal courts from enjoining state court
proceedings, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 (West 2017), but this bar is riddled with numerous exceptions. State
judiciaries also cannot enjoin federal court proceedings or bar individuals from filing federal claims. Gen.
Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977); Donovan v. Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
87 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
88 Hester, supra note 39, at 73.
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Last, the federal courts may have to navigate judicial federalism
constraints on their ability to provide the relief requested in climate liability
tort actions. For example, if a claimant requests injunctive relief, the federal
courts may face limits on their ability to weigh the equities related to the
injunction if a federal statute constrains the court¶s ability to look outside
Congressionally determined values.89 Because these constraints arise from
the foundational nature of the federal courts¶ powers, those courts may not
be able to grant injunctive relief even if the underlying claims rest on state
laws and the state¶s courts could otherwise issue the injunction.
2. Horizontal allocations of judicial authority (state-state)
Judicial federalism principles also steer the allocation of powers
between the courts of differing states. In particular, beyond dividing power
between the federal and state courts, these principles also require that the
respective state courts respect each other¶s decisions and assure the integrity
of their separate operations within federal constitutional constraints. For
example, while a state court cannot display favoritism to claimants based on
their residence or citizenship, judicial federalism limitations nonetheless
allow a state court to entertain claims brought by a sovereign of that state that
its private citizens or nonresidents could not bring (for example, by
recognizing the legislature¶s waiver of statute of limitations periods for
claims brought by the state).90
Next, the horizontal allocation of judicial powers under federalism
constraints also arises starkly with extraterritorial claims. In particular, a state
judicial forum may lack in personam jurisdiction over non-resident defendants that a federal court could nonetheless exercise.91 This constraint may
prove especially critical with climate tort liability claims that seek recovery
from defendants who have emitted from locations literally throughout the
world. Beyond the simple exercise of jurisdictional authority, these judicial
federalism principles also inform how state judiciaries interpret state tort laws

89

Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
The U.S. Supreme Court has long acknowledged the authority of state legislatures to modify
the conditions for statutes of limitations that might apply to claims brought against their sovereign state
governments. Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 528 (1857); Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.)
311 (1843).
91 A federal district typically can exercise jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the long-arm
jurisdictional statute of the state where the federal court sits. If the state¶s law does not extend personal
jurisdiction, the federal court can nonetheless exercise jurisdiction when the accompanying federal statute
authorizes it or the case involves an alien party otherwise outside the state court¶s jurisdiction. Federal
district courts can also reach parties outside the state who live within the federal judicial district and within
100 miles of the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(B)±(2).
90
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or statutes to apply to extraterritorial activities. Like the federal courts, many
state court systems will interpret a state statute to apply outside the borders
of that state only upon a clearly expressed desire by the state legislature to
grant its law an exterritorial reach.92
Last, if one state judicial system¶s judgment to impose climate tort
liability must be enforced in another state that does not recognize the legal
basis for such claims, horizontal constraints will also quickly surface. For
example, Texas has enacted legislation that specifically limits the imposition
of tort liability for damages allegedly caused by the emission of greenhouse
gases from activities otherwise regulated by federal laws or permits.93
Defendants may wish to resist the collection or enforcement of such a
judgment by alleging that the Texas statute establishes a public policy against
the enforcement of such foreign judgments. In addition, many states have
passed tort reform legislation that limits the ability of claimants to recover
punitive damages, impose joint and several liability, or pursue claims for
injuries that occurred prior to a statute of repose (even if not discovered until
later).94 It remains unclear whether these tort reform statutes will have the
unintended effect of foreclosing climate liability tort claims on a sweeping,
or even categorical, basis.
B. Potential Roles for Judicial Federalism Principles in Climate Tort
Liability Litigation
So how can judicial federalism help direct the administration and
management of state law climate liability tort actions, in both federal and
state court systems? On the horizontal conflict level, judicial federalism
principles could urge a broader interpretation of the Oulette and American
Electric Power Co. precedents to allow the pursuit of state law climate tort
claims in states where the injury occurred (rather than the place of the
emission), because the greenhouse gases that contributed to the harms could
be emitted from virtually any location. This approach would respect both the

92 Similar concerns may drive a state judiciary¶s willingness to apply forum non conveniens
doctrines to climate liability tort claims rooted in state laws when the causative actions, testifying
witnesses and parties, and responsive documents all lie within a different state or nation.
93 See discussion supra note 53.
94 ANDREW C. COOK, THE FEDERALIST SOC¶Y, TORT REFORM UPDATE: RECENTLY ENACTED
LEGISLATIVE REFORMS AND STATE COURT CHALLENGES (2012), https://fedsoc-cmspublic.s3.amazonaws.com/update/pdf/h51Xzdd6qKP4hY5Jw6e2hSAL4ZyWWiUcT5bHD05i.pdf
(summarizing recent state tort law reform initiatives); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT
REFORM:
EVIDENCE
FROM
THE
STATES
3±8
(2004),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5549/report.pdf. Cf. CTS Corp. v.
Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014) (CERCLA fails to preempt state statutes of repose for hazardous
substances exposure claims).
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Congressional allocation of power and permit authority within the general
framework of the federal Clean Air Act, while upholding the powers of state
court judiciaries to resolve these claims under their respective laws and
procedures.
On the vertical plane, the resolution of conflicts between federal and
state judicial powers and competence will also depend heavily on the specific
facts and parties underlying the climate tort action. Of course, federal courts
routinely demonstrate the capacity to handle complex environmental claims
brought by large numbers of plaintiffs against numerous defendants, and they
have developed innovative and effective tactics to administer complex trials
and contested proceedings. In the vast number of tort actions following the
Deepwater Horizon incident,95 for example, the federal trial court used novel
scheduling and discovery tactics, bifurcated and staged trials for liability and
allocations, and bundled pleading and discovery processes to expeditiously
resolve tort claims that otherwise might have lasted for decades.96 While
climate liability tort actions differ in critical and fundamental ways from the
contamination tort actions brought after the Deepwater Horizon spill,97 they
nonetheless offer opportunities for similarly creative docket management
techniques and dispositive motion practice.
If states choose to coordinate their approaches to climate tort claims,
judicial federalism principles could also affect their strategies. If state
plaintiffs entered into a formal arrangement to share litigation costs or
prospectively allocate damage awards, this agreement arguably might raise
questions about the limits imposed by the Compacts Clause of the U.S
Constitution.98 Attempts to use class actions in conjunction with aggressive
res judicata and collateral estoppel claims may also face federal or state
95 The blowout of the Macondo deepwater well in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 led to the largest
marine oil spill in U.S. history. See NAT¶L COMM¶N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND
OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING
(2011),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf
(final report of national commission¶s investigation into the causes of the Deepwater Horizon disaster).
96 John Cruden, Steve O¶Rourke & Sarah Himmelhoch, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Litigation: Proof of Concept for the Manual for Complex Litigation and the 2015 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 65 (2016).
97 For example, the California and New York state law tort actions purportedly do not pose a
clearly federal question of law and basis for jurisdiction (i.e., admiralty jurisdiction), cannot point to a
solitary identified incident that caused the damages, lack a clearly delineated and manageable group of
defendants, and lack any dispute over the nexus between the actions causing the release and the damages
suffered by the plaintiffs.
98 The Compacts Clause of the U.S. Constitution bars states entering into ³any Agreement or
Compact with any other State´ without the consent of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The federal
courts have struck down agreements as unapproved compacts predominantly when states use them to
impermissibility encroach of the powers of the federal government or non-compact states. U.S. Steel Corp.
v. Multistate Tax Comm¶n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
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judicial reluctance to allow the conscription of judicial mechanisms for state
policy goals and monetary recoveries.
III. POSSIBLE LONG-TERM TRAJECTORIES FOR JUDICIAL
FEDERALISM AND CLIMATE TORT CLAIMS
Judicial federalism has already begun to shape the state law claims
brought in the newest wave of litigation. The imposition of exclusive federal
jurisdiction for bankruptcy claims, for example, led to the dismissal of
Peabody Coal from the California tort actions because the company had
previously discharged general contingent claims as part of its recent
bankruptcy action.99 Claims against U.S. governmental entities or agencies,
or foreign sovereign entities or their corporate forms, will also likely run
aground against constraints on state judiciaries to exercise jurisdiction over
such parties.100
Beyond such sparring over the respective jurisdictional powers of state
and federal courts, however, the ultimate effect of judicial federalism
principles may lie in their support for legislative or regulatory action to
clarify the power of courts to resolve climate tort liability claims. At least one
state, as noted earlier, has already acted unilaterally to foreclose such tort
actions explicitly, and the prior tort reform legislation passed by other states
may unintentionally serve to accomplish similar outcomes. 101 Ultimately, if
state law climate tort actions create conflicting obligations and risks of
catastrophic liability for U.S. industry, Congress may pursue federal
legislation to restrict the availability of tort litigation as it has done for other
classes of claims in the past (such as the Class Action Fairness Act of
2017).102
In sum, the shift of climate tort liability litigation to state courts goes
beyond a simple change in tactics. It reflects a fundamental change in the
posture, prospects, and feasibility of these lawsuits. While the principles of
judicial federalism will help to clarify the allocation of powers and
responsibilities between the federal and state court systems when faced with
overlapping or conflict state law tort claims, the prospect of conflicting and
incommensurate verdicts and liabilities will increase pressures for either
regulatory or legislative actions on both the federal and state levels to provide
99 See, e.g., In re Peabody Energy Corp., No. 16-42529-399, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3691 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. Oct. 24, 2017) (dismissing climate tort claims as subject to bankruptcy bar raised by company¶s
prior Chapter 11 proceeding).
100 See discussion supra note 19 (motions to implead Statoil as a third-party defendant after the
plaintiffs had voluntarily dismissed it because of concerns over sovereign immunity).
101 See discussion supra note 53; see also Hester, supra note 39, at 74.
102 The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(d), 1443, 1711±15 (West 2017).
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a more unified and consistent answer to climate liability claims. These
actions should aim to provide greater democratic accountability, economic
predictability, and judicial consistency in this emerging field of liability
claims.

